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THE NEED FOR CLEARER CONGRESSIONAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES
Senator Edward V. Long*
INTRODUCTION
There are basically three types of arbitrary decisions. One type
is a decision characterized by the lack of any determining principle.
The decision-maker has complete and total discretion in the exer-
cise of his authority which affects substantive rights, duties or
obligations of others.'
The second type of arbitrary decision is characterized not so
much by the lack of a determining principle, as by the broad or
generalized nature of the principles which do exist. The latter type
is much more prevalent in the modern day administrative process,
and at the same time much more difficult to remedy.
The third type of arbitrary decisions results from factors
which are extrinsic to, but inextricably intertwined with and hav-
ing a great influence on the decision which is rendered.
Obviously, to avoid a decision based on the sole discretion of
a single authority, all that is necessary is to provide the standards
which limit or circumscribe the exercise of the discretion of the
decision-maker. It is not so simple in the second case.
In the second category of cases, the decisions are based on
standards too broad or generalized to provide meaningful direction
to the person or agency responsible for making a decision in a par-
ticular case. The result is that the same generalized standards are
often applied differently in cases which do not involve significant
factual disparities.
In the third category of cases, the ex parte influence may be
intentional in which case, if discovered, a remedy is provided by
way of judicial review or other such action. If the ex parte influ-
ence goes undiscovered, of course, the injustice is greater because
the victim has been deprived of all means of redress by normal
legitimate processes.
It is much easier to find workable solutions to the first and
third category of cases than it is for the second category. Hence,
* LL.B. 1932, University of Missouri; United States Senator from Mis-
souri; Chairman, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Pro-
cedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
1 Fox Film Corp. v. Trumbull, 7 F.2d 715, 727 (D. Conn. 1925).
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the remainder of the article will deal with only those decisions
based on determining principles which are too general to serve
as a meaningful indication of Congressional intent and which there-
fore lead to results inconsistent with the advancement of an efficient
and fair administrative process.
As an example of a broad standard, many agencies are told
by Congress in one way or another to regulate in the "public inter-
est."'2 Too often, Congress fails to provide any indication of what
it would consider to be the public interest in an individual case
or in a category of cases. The problem becomes more complex,
because too often, after a program of regulation is begun, no one
is sure just what the public interest is at the time or what it will
be a few years in the future. A major factor here is the fact that
the agencies are faced with so many new problems which are so
complex and numerous that the judgment and sagacity of the
Olympian Gods would be taxed.3 The problems do not readily
admit of definition, and any decision made without the problem
properly defined most likely deserves the criticism that it is arbi-
trary. Moreover, the very complexity of the problems often causes
delay in formulating policies to deal with them and this delay also
plays its role in the formulation of arbitrary decisions.
The problem of delay in administrative proceedings has been
considered by the best experts on administrative law. Yet, there
is no sign that any thing is or could be done to reduce delay in
administrative decision-making. A decision, rendered one, two,
five or ten years 4 after a proceeding was instituted, can be consid-
ered arbitrary. Regardless of the adherence to procedural regularity
a decision so long delayed is arbitrary if for no other reason than
the fact that the results of a decision so long delayed are often the
same as had no decision been made, or if made, made in ignorance
or disregard for the law, the facts or binding precedents. For exam-
ple, one agency did not render its decision until the business con-
cern involved had become defunct after incurring the legal and
other fees associated with the presentation of its case.5 Regardless
2 E.g., Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
3 For example in the field of communications, the Federal Communica-
tions Commission is confronted with the difficult problem of increas-
ing congestion in the frequency spectrum; the various agencies dealing
with transportation face the crisis of urban commuter snarls; the Civil
Aeronautics Board must unravel the multitudinous factors of both
private and public interests in establishing efficient and sufficient air
routes.
4 Long, Proposed Changes in Administrative Law, 19 Sw. L.J. 203 (1965);
FDA Papers (1968).
5 Evis Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 287 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 824 (1961).
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of the fact that no procedural or other irregularities had occurred,
the delay and concomitant expense associated therewith, adversely
affected this private citizen just as if the administrator had capri-
ciously and whimsically condemned his property.
All of these factors (the generalized standard, the complexity
and number of the problems and the delay in finding solutions)
are involved in those decisions which may today be criticized as
arbitrary. They represent a serious problem for the growth of the
administrative process and admit of no easy solution.
CLEARER STANDARDS-CONGRESS' TASK
Agencies exercise only those powers delegated to them by Con-
gress.6 Too often, however, Congress delegates powers without ade-
quately defining how, when, or if these powers are to be used in a
given situation. Congress usually contents itself with commanding
agencies to regulate in the "public interest" but either fails to define
what the public interest is or should be or to provide adequate
guidelines to be used in determining what the public interest is
in individual cases.
Obviously, attempts in 1952 to define with great exactitude what
the public interest in communications, transportation, or housing
will be for 1968 or 1975 may result in rigid, inflexible, unresponsive
administration to the current, constantly changing problems inher-
ent in areas so basically intertwined with the needs of the public.
Admitting this criticism is valid, it is submitted that Congress can
maintain flexibility in administration, and yet establish with greater
clarity the nature of the public interest in the particular area of
concern.
For example, Congress established a policy that the use of the
public airwaves is limited to those individuals which can establish
in a licensing proceeding that the "public convenience, interest, or
necessity will be served ' 7 by that individual's proposed use of a
particular portion of the frequency spectrum as defined by channel
designations. The Federal Communications Commission has run
into serious difficulties in administering its duties under this stan-
dard in recent years due to the rapidly increasing congestion of
available frequency space. The standard of the public interest is no
6 CAB v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316 (1961); Regents of the Uni-
versity System of Georgia v. Carroll, 338 U.S. 586 (1950); Trans-Pacific
Freight Conf. of Japan v. Federal Maritime Bd., 302 F.2d 875 (D.C.
Cir. 1962); Federal Power Comm'n v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co.,
337 U.S. 498 (1949).
7 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1964).
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longer sufficient to resolve this problem because the use to which
the competing interests (whose increasing demands for more and
more frequency space have caused the frequency shortage) wish to
put the frequencies they seek are all vested with some degree of
the public interest. The commission is therefore placed in a quan-
dry. Its job is to regulate in the public interest, not to decide which
of two or more legitimate and equally important interests of the
public is to be emphasized to the detriment of the other. This is
Congress' job as direct representatives of the people.
Congress, however, has not enunciated any new standards for
the direction of the commission since 1934. Hence, the commission,
left to its own devices, must either decide an issue it is not meant
to decide or vacillate, stall and delay until Congress provides the
means to solve the problem. In either case, the decision of the com-
mission if it acts, or if it refuses to act, is arbitrary in that it must
act without a meaningful determining principle.8
It is Congress' duty to examine the experience of experts in
this area, and then decide which future course of regulation will
best serve the communication needs of this nation. Similarly Con-
gress' duty is clear in other areas where there is need for a review
of standards enunciated when the causes for some of the most com-
plex problems facing the agencies today were not even in existence.
CLEARER STANDARDS-AGENCIES' TASK
The major function of an expert administrative agency is to de-
velop policy to guide the future course of conduct of the general
public and those particular members directly subject to its juris-
diction. However agencies have long vacillated in making, or
neglected or refused to make, policy decisions in their particular
areas of expertise. 9 Ths lack of policy formulation by adminis-
trative agencies has been cited time and again as the outstanding
example of the cause of many other ills plaguing a more efficient
and effective administrative process.10 The Administrative Con-
ference made a specific recommendation in order to encourage
greater devotion of time and effort to policy making. Yet the root
cause for the problem remains.
In the view of this author, as well as others, most agencies still
prefer to proceed on a case-by-case basis in developing policy."
8 BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 134 (4th ed. 1957).
9 STAF OF SUBCOMM. ON ADmINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON
REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (Comm. Print 1960);
Long, Proposed Changes in Administrative Law, 19 Sw. L.J. 203 (1965).
10 S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 153, 158 (1963).
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This procedure, while easier in terms of keeping the complexities of
the issues involved to a minimum, usually delays the formulation
of a cohesive, intelligible policy generally applicable to all con-
cerned. In addition it creates confusion and often contradictory
results in the application of, what can at best be considered, only
an interim policy.1
Decisions based on policies still in their developmental stages
cause many decisions to be arbitrary; because of both the lack of
adequate determining principles and the delay in reaching solu-
tions which is engendered by the ad hoc treatment of cases involv-
ing issues generally applicable to others subject to the jurisdiction
of the agency.
CURRENT LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS AND PROPOSALS
FOR AVOIDANCE AND CORRECTION
Proposals for avoidance of arbitrary decisions are easier to
develop than those for correction. In the latter case, the obvious
courses of judicial review, administrative reconsideration or amend-
atory legislation are available to parties aggrieved by administra-
tive action. 3 However, while procedures are available to obtain
relief against an arbitrary decision,14 usually much time and expense
is involved. Furthermore, unless the decision is particularly egreg-
ious or one which affects basic policy concerning vital interests of
the public, the factors of success all too often mitigate in favor of
the status quo. It is much more difficult to overturn a decision once
made than it is to try to prevent the causes which contribute to the
rendering of an arbitrary decision.
There are two recent developments which may offer a solution
to the problem. Congress has enacted a law setting up the Admin-
11 See Hearings on S. 1663 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Prac-
tice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1964); Hearings on S. 1160, S. 1336, S. 1758 and S. 1879 Before
the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); and Hearings
on S. 518 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Pro-
cedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,(1967). In all of these hearings not one agency expressed the opinion
that it wanted or needed more time in order to develop more compre-
hensive policies.
12 As a most recent example is the Federal Communications Commission,
which, perplexed with the problems of the burgeoning community
antenna television industry, has specifically adopted the policy of pro-
ceeding on a case-by-case basis, SECOND REPORT AND ORDER, 2 F.C.C.
2d 725, 6 P &F RADIO REG. 2d 1717 (1966); and see 47 C.F.R. § § 74.1101-
09 (1966).
13 E.g. 5 U.S.C.A. § § 701-06 (1967).
14 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6334(a) (5).
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istrative Conference of the United States.15 The task of this body,
composed mainly of government attorneys and administrators, is
to keep the administrative process under close scrutiny on a con-
tinuing basis. It should therefore be able to devote at least some
of its efforts toward finding means which would facilitate equitable
settlements of controveries between agencies and those it regulates
in cases where due to the lack of definite guidelines or the complexi-
ties of the issues involved, the decision rendered necessarily involves
the exercise of discretion which is not totally within the standards
or guidelines set forth. This is not to indicate that the conference
would engage in the negotiations of individual cases, but would
rather explore new ideas and methods which could be adopted by
several of the agencies to lessen the impact in individual cases
involving decisions adopting new policies or revising old ones.
The other possibility is the creation of an Ombudsman to handle
the complaints of citizens who believe they have been dealt with
unfairly by their government. This topic has been explored at
some depth by Congress 16 and numerous articles have been written
in regard to the feasibility and desirability of instituting such an
office. 17 The reader is referred to these materials as it would be
beyond the scope of the present article to deal at length with this
topic. However, it can be said that this office if instituted, unlike the
Administrative Conference, would deal directly with cases in which
a party or parties allege they have been victims of an arbitrary
decision. The vast majority of cases that would be handled by such
an office as the Ombudsman would undoubtedly involve those cases
in which the aggrieved party lacks the resources to pursue the tra-
ditional procedures available for redress of injuries inflicted by
unfair or arbitrary administrative decisions. The opportunity pre-
sented by this office for correcting arbitrary decisions in cases in
which there is now no possibility of relief is in this author's view
too promising to be ignored by those truly interested in improving
the administrative process.
Many alternatives present themselves when considering how
to avoid arbitrary decisions. In this area the main responsibility lies
with Congress.
As already indicated, the root cause of arbitrariness must ulti-
mately be traced to the lack of sufficient guidelines for implementa-
15 Administrative Conference Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § § 571-76 (1967).
16 Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 190 Before the Subcomm. on Administra-
tive Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1966).
17 E.g., Kass, We Can, Indeed, Fight City Hall: the Office and Concept of
Ombudsman, 53 A.B.A.J. 231 (1967).
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tion of the public policies enacted into law by the Congress. In
order to meet the new and changing problems confronting the ad-
ministrative agencies today, the organic acts of each agency should
be reviewed and amended if necessary to clarify and update the
duties and responsibilities of those exercising the delegated author-
ity of Congress. As a matter of fact, Congress and the agencies do
devote considerable time to this very effort. Yet, more could, and
must, be done, if we are to keep pace with the changes occurring
in the nature and direction of our national interests.
In addition to redefining basic policy directions, Congress must
also develop new procedural tools for the administrative process.
Unfortunately, as with so many administrative reforms, this effort
has been the victim of excessive delay. Back in the 88th Congress,18
a bill was introduced which was designed to update the Administra-
tive Procedure Act of 1946.19 This bill and its successors20 were sub-
ject to extensive comment and testimony by the leading practition-
ers and experts in administrative law. Yet, the proposal which itself
originated from a detailed study in 1955 has yet to be enacted though
it has undergone extensive substantive revisions in response to
criticisms and suggestions of the agencies subject to its provisions.21
Section 557 of the present bill, contains detailed decisional pro-
cedures designed to assist agencies in making policy decisions.
2 2
The bill invests greater decisional authority in the hearing examiner.
It also establishes specific appellate procedures designed to relieve
the chief policy makers of the agencies from decisional duties in
the vast number of routine adjudications which do not involve
issues of major significance with respect to the creation or revision
of major policy matters.
The appellate structure established by this bill should help avoid
arbitrary decisions in three ways. First, by vesting greater deci-
sional authority in the hearing examiner, there is less chance that
those cases in which factual issues are decisive will be ultimately
decided by someone unfamiliar with demeanor of witnesses, the
relevancy of exhibits, and so forth,-in short, by one who must of
18 S. 1663, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
'9 The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 no longer exists due to its
recent codification, 5 U.S.C.A. § § 551-59 and § § 701-06 (1967).
20 S. 1336, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); S. 518, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967);
the current proposal is S. 2771, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
21 All 106 Federal agencies are technically subject to the provisions of
5 U.S.C.A. § § 551-59 (1967), however, due to the various functions
performed by different agencies and various exemptions in the act,
many are exempt totally or partially from its application.
22 See Long, The Proposed New Administrative Procedure Act, 55 GEO.
L.J. 761 (1967).
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necessity review a "cold" record. Hence, the bill would minimize
the defects of any institutional decisions, create greater confidence
in the fairness of the agency and help to avoid frivolous or nit-
picking appeals.
Second, if the benefits just described are achieved through
enactment of the proposed procedural revisions, the authors of the
legislation believe that the agency heads will be freer to devote
more of their valuable time to the broader range matters of adopt-
ing, perfecting, revising and clarifying the agencies' major policies.
This in turn should make the task of the agency's other decisional
authorities, the examiners, review boards, and so forth, less onerous
by facilitating the application of general policies to particular cases.
Finally, the agency heads confronted with new problems for
which there is inadequate precedent, would be able to devote more
time to obtaining clarification of Congress' position on particular
policy matters or in justifying the needs for additional manpower
and funds when seeking appropriations from Congress.
It should also be noted, that now that the Administrative Con-
ference has been established,23 a promising opportunity is presented
for a continuous ongoing study of methods to improve the overall
decisional quality, and hence reduce both actual arbitrary decisions
and complaints of arbitrary decisions.
The agencies task in eliminating arbitrary decision is secondary
to the responsibility of Congress, but by no means less important.
Regardless of the clarity with which Congress states its policies,
administrative action may totally ignore, avoid or defeat the goals
sought to be obtained by the legislative mandate.
For example, Congress in 1949 enacted the Truth-In-Negotiating
Act 24 designed to avoid the misuse of the billions of dollars of the
taxpayer's money in procuring the materials and services necessary
to the maintenance of the national defense. Yet, on April 20, 1967,
an account was given on the floor of the Senate that revealed that
the General Accounting Office had saved taxpayers more than
23 On Oct. 19, 1967, President Johnson appointed Jerre S. Williams Pro-
fessor from the University of Texas, as Chairman of the Administrative
Conference. The council which is to assist Mr. Williams includes As-
sistant Attorney General Frank M. Wozencraft, who will serve as As-
sistant Chairman, FCC Chairman Rosel H. Hyde, SEC Chairman Man-
uel F. Cohen, ICC Commissioner Willard Deason and USIA Director
Leonard Marks as the government members. Non-government mem-
bers include Columbia University Law School Professor Walter Gell-
horn, business executive Frank Pace, Jr. and attorneys Whitney North
Seymour and Harold L. Russell.
24 41 U.S.C. § § 251-60 (1949).
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seventy-two million dollars over a period of a few years through
scattered spot checking for violations of the Truth-In-Negotiating
Act.25 Actual violations totaled 130 million dollars, but according
to the statement made on the Senate floor only seventy-two million
dollars had been recovered.26
The agencies task in avoiding arbitrary decisions is therefore
clear. Where definite standards are promulgated by Congress to
govern specific agency action, those standards must be adhered to
with the utmost assiduity, and always with a view towards the
most effective implementation of the policies underlying the pub-
lished standards.
In addition, the agencies should strive for the most meaning-
ful participation possible in the Administrative Conference. This
author has previously cautioned that a danger exists that the con-
ference without proper leadership or cooperation from its partici-
pants could debilitate into an ineffective debating society.27 Too
often, it is easier to discuss problems, until they disappear due to
age or because the harm resulting therefrom has already been sus-
tained, than it is to conscientiously work to find solutions which
may necessitate immediate and couragous action. 28 Experience has
shown that agencies are reluctant to change the methods that are
familiar from long use.29 The conference will be a dismal failure
25 113 CONG. B.Ec. 5620 (daily ed. April 20, 1967).
28 It is more than passing interest to note that the Pentagon raised
similar objections to the enactment of the Truth-In-Negotiating Act,
as were raised to the revision of Section 553 of Title 5 (at the time
Section 4 of S. 518, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), now section 553 of
S. 2771, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) which would provide for public
notice and participation in making rules to govern government pro-
curement, viz., that the legislation is unnecessary and would deprive
procurement officials of the flexibility needed to negotiate contracts.
27 Long, Proposed Changes in Administrative Law, 19 Sw. L.J. 203, 227
(1965).
28 For a breakdown of how the major regulatory agencies responded to
the recommendations of the last temporary Administrative Conference,
see STAPP OF SuBcov ITTEE ON ADmviINIsTRATIvE PRACTICE AND PRO-
cEDuRE, SENATE CoiVmTTEE ON T=E JUDIcIARY, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
SURVEY OF SELECTED AGENcIEs' COMPLIANCE WITH RECOMnENDATiONS
oF THE TmvPORARY AmmusTRATivE CONrERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
(Comm. Print 1967).
29 Through all of the hearings on the various bills to amend the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act of 1946, there was a singular lack of any
positive recommendations from the agencies which offered significant
revisions of present procedures. At the same time, the agencies vocifer-
ously protested that the changes proposed by the draftsman would
seriously affect their current operations in an adverse manner. See
Hearings, supra note 11.
and the public will suffer a disservice if academic discussions take
the place of carefully considered action.3 0
CONCLUSION
The means to correct arbitrary decisions are now available. In
this regard, the problem lies not in knowing what remedy to pursue
after the fact, but in the time and expense related thereto.
The more meaningful remedy is to prevent the causes which
result in arbitrary decisions. But here, it is the knowledge of what
to do that is troublesome.
This article expresses the view that avoidance of most arbi-
trary exercises of the decisional function in administrative pro-
ceedings can best be achieved by the clearer definition of both the
congressional policies to be administered and the administrative
policies adopted in response thereto. The task is far from simple,
but if accomplished holds great promise for elimination of most of
the factors which lie at the root of arbitrary decisions.
30 Every confidence is reposed in Chairman William's ability to direct
the efforts of the conference to more fruitful labors. But the chairman,
more than anyone, also realizes that to accomplish significant improve-
ments the sincere dedication and cooperation of the other members are
essential.
